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I. Introduction 
 
 
In the field of international environmental law and development, the term “land-
grabbing” refers to the large-scale acquisition of agricultural land in developing 
countries by multi-national corporations or governments intent to secure their long-term 
food supplies. In Pakistan, the term refers to something more prosaic but equally 
pernicious, namely the theft of private and public land by criminal gangs. Not a day 
goes by without a newspaper reporting cases of alleged land grabbing or violent crimes 
connected with property disputes and the theft of land. In Pakistan, the term land 
grabbing is invariably connected with the activities of what is variously referred to as 
the land mafia, land grabbers and Qabza groups. The latter word is from the Urdu 
language meaning “occupying” albeit with the connotation of an occupation by force 
or deceit. 
 
Land grabbing by Qabza groups covers a range of illegal activities from the outright 
occupation of land by force to more subtle means, such as the filing of baseless civil 
cases claiming ownership rights to a property. With civil litigation slow and inefficient, 
the true owners of the property can either fight the case in court and lose their ability to 
sell it during the pendency of the civil suit or pay a sum of money to the blackmailer in 
order for the case to be withdrawn. 
 
Land grabbing is not listed as a separate offence in official crime statistics but has 
acquired notoriety as a crime that not only affects a large number of people but also the 
state itself, given that many of the properties illegally “grabbed” are owned by the state. 
Thus, a recent newspaper article titled “Menace of Land Grabbing” [The Express 
Tribune 28 April 2018] describes the illegal encroachment in the town of Johi in the 
province of Sindh where “land grabbers have taken over almost all prime lands of the 
town. Among the encroached land is the irrigation’s department land, car garage and 
surrounding land of Mukhtiar Office Johi and freshwater ponds. They haven’t even 
spared historical places such as an ancient Hindu temple.” 
 
The scourge of land grabbing and the violence that goes with it has even registered in 
the UK, where the Home Office issued a “Country Policy and Information Note 
Pakistan: Land Disputes” [January 2017], in order to enable case-workers to evaluate 
claims for political asylum based on the fear of persecution as a result of a land dispute. 
The USAID Country Profile “Pakistan – Property Rights & Resource Governance” 
points out that “Squatting and land-grabbing are common in Pakistan. […] Pakistan 
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is also home to individuals and groups known as the Land Mafia who illegally take 
possession of land or claim ownership of land and dispossess true owners through legal 
or extra-legal means.”  
 
In Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, the ever-growing number of mosques reflects the 
impotence of the Capital Development Authority [“CDA”] to enforce planning laws as 
well as the rise of Qabza groups. According to the CDA’s director of Urban Planning 
“mosque building is nothing more than a method of land grabbing.” [Hull, p. 474] 
Overseas Pakistani’s are reluctant to buy land in Pakistan because they are “often 
absentee landlords and thus especially vulnerable to illegal dispossession.” [Ewing, p. 
536] Land-grabbing has even been linked to the practice of bigamy among landowners 
in South Asia “to keep different women, often on different lots of land in order to defend 
the land from land-grabbers.” [Holden, 228] 
 
Newspapers, human rights’ reports and even the Supreme Court of Pakistan itself 
suggest that state functionaries are often reluctant to initiate legal proceedings against 
land grabbers either as a result of corruption or of apathy. In the unreported judgement 
of Gulshan Bibi and others vs. Muhammad Sadiq and others [Civil Petition No. 41 of 
2008 and Civil Appeal No. 2054 of 20017 & 1208 of 2015, date of hearing: 15 June 
2016] the Supreme Court explained the phenomenon as: 
 
The terms ‘land grabbers’ or ‘Qabza Group’ or ‘Qabza Mafia’ in ordinary 
parlance refer to a distinct class of offenders who usurp property of others in 
an organized manner. They mostly target unoccupied or deserted urban 
properties belonging to the Federal Government, the Provincial Governments, 
Municipal authorities, autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies, Trusts or 
Waqfs and at times even properties belonging to private persons. By resorting 
to various forms of fraud and forgery the professional land grabbers or Qabza 
Mafia first get the targeted property transferred in the official records in the 
name of a person of their confidence and then create third party interest 
thereon. In doing so the face of the professional land grabbers or Qabza Group 
remains hidden. They indulge in land grabbing through their proxy so that the 
real beneficiary of land grabbing could not be identified. With every new act of 
illegal dispossession the face of the proxy keeps changing.  
 
Rina Saeed Khan in a newspaper article entitled “When Land Grabber Rule” [The 
Express Tribune, 28 January 2014] writes that “The reason that land mafias get away 
with their illegal activities is because of the patronage of powerful politicians and 
government officials — it really is as simple as that. The land mafia is a nexus 
comprising politicians, criminals, property dealers and corrupt government 
officials”. 
  
Pakistan’s legal system seems incapable of offering any meaningful relief to the victims 
of land grabbing, be it private citizens or indeed the state. Estimates suggest that land 
disputes make up between 50% to 75% of cases brought before civil courts with up to 
1 million cases pending and awaiting final adjudication. USAID Country Profile 
“Pakistan – Property Rights & Resource Governance” identifies as major causes of land 
disputes “inaccurate or fraudulent land records, erroneous boundary descriptions that 
create overlapping claims, and multiple registrations to the same land by different 
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parties” and states that “Credible evidence of land rights is often nearly impossible to 
obtain.”  
 
The scourge of land grabbing was supposed to be stemmed by the enactment of the 
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. This act, in nine short sections, created an offence of 
illegal land grabbing, punishable with up to ten years’ imprisonment, and allowed the 
trial court to return the property to its rightful owner. Promising in its Preamble to 
protect the lawful owners and occupiers of immovable properties from their illegal or 
forcible dispossession therefrom by the property grabbers, the Illegal Dispossession Act 
2005 was meant to direct the full force of the criminal law against the land mafia. An 
accelerated trial, stiff punishments and easy access – criminal complaints could be filed 
directly in the criminal court rather than a police station – would finally provide victims 
of Qabza groups the means to fight back. 
 
This article charts the implementation and the (mis)-use of the Illegal Dispossession 
Act 2005 through the lens of reported judgements of the five high courts and the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan over the past 13 years. What has been the effect of the 
creation of a new offence of land-grabbing? In what type of situations is the new law 
invoked and who are its beneficiaries? Is the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 an answer 
to the claim that irregular and inadequate legislation causes excessive litigation which 
buries courts under a “mountain of cases”? [Siddique, p. 378] Has the law fulfilled its 
objectives? 
 
II. The Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 
 
In Pakistan’s legal history, the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 [“2005 Act”] is not the 
first attempt to control disputes over land. The Indian Penal Code 1860, now called the 
Pakistan Penal Code 1860 [“PPC”], contains a finely tuned cadence of criminal 
offences all concerned with the unlawful entering of someone else’s property. Starting 
with the offence of criminal trespass (section 441)1, house trespass (section 442)2, 
                                                 
1 Section 441PPC “Criminal trespass: Whoever enters into or upon property in the 
possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or 
annoy any person in possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or 
upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult 
or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit 
"criminal trespass".”  
 
2 Section 442 PPC “House-trespass: Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering 
into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any 
building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said 
to commit "house-trespass".  Explanation: The introduction of any part of the 
criminal trespasser's body is entering sufficient to constitute house trespass.”  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lurking house trespass (section 443)3, lurking house trespass by night (section 444)4 the 
list ended with section 445, the offence of house breaking: 
 
A person is said to commit "house-breaking" who commits house trespass if he 
effects his entrance into the house or-any part of it in any of the six ways 
hereinafter described; or if, being in the house or any part of it for the purpose 
of committing an offence, or, having committed an offence therein, he quits the 
house or any part of it in any of such six ways, that is to say:  
First: If he enters or quits through a passage made by himself, or by any abettor 
of the house- trespass, in order to the committing of the house-trespass.  
Secondly: If he enters or quits through any passage not intended by any person, 
other than himself or an abettor of the offence, for human entrance; or through 
any passage to which he has obtained access by scaling or climbing over any 
wall or building.  
Thirdly: If he enters or quits through any passage which he or any abettor of 
the house trespass has opened, in order to the committing of the house-trespass 
by any means by which that passage was not intended by the occupier of the 
house to be-opened.  
Fourthly: If he enters or quits by opening any lock in order to the committing of 
the house- trespass, or in order to the quitting of the house after a house-
trespass.  
Fifthly: if he effects his entrance or departure by using criminal force of 
committing an assault, or by threatening any person with assault.  
Sixthly: If he enters or quits any passage which he knows to have been fastened 
against such entrance or departure, and to. have been fastened by himself or by 
an abettor of the house-trespass.  
Explanation: Any out-house or building occupied with a house, and between, 
which and such house there is an immediate internal communication, is part of 
the house within the meaning of this section.  
 
These criminal offences are followed by 19 separate sections, from sections 446 to 462 
PPC, providing for punishments ranging from fines to imprisonment, depending on the 
circumstances and other criminal acts accompanying them. For example, section 457 
PPC which provides a punishment of a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment for 
committing the offence “Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night in order 
to commit offence punishable with imprisonment” with an intention to commit the 
offence of theft. 
   
Between 1949 and 2013, there were only 25 reported cases under Section 441 “Criminal 
Trespass”, the most general of these offences, with the majority being successful 
                                                 
3 Section 443 PPC “Lurking House-trespass: Whoever commits house-trespass 
having taken precautions to conceal such house-trespass from some person who has a 
right to exclude or eject the trespasser from the building, tent or vessel which is the 
subject of the trespass, is said to commit "lurking house-trespass".”   
 
4 Section 444 PPC “Lurking house-trespass by night: Whoever commits lurking 
house-trespass after sunset and before sunrise, is said to commit 'lurking house-
trespass by night".”  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appeals against convictions on the ground that the prosecution could not prove a 
criminal intent to commit the criminal trespass. Thus the prosecution’s failure to prove 
criminal intent resulted in acquittal in Abdul Razzaq v. S.H.O. [2008 PCr.LJ 812]. 
Further, the fact that the property in question was subject to a civil dispute between co-
sharers resulted in an acquittal for the offence of criminal trespass in the case of Malik 
Muhammad Zameer v. Shamim Akhtar [2006 PCr.LJ 539]. The offences under sections 
443 and 444, respectively lurking house-trespass and lurking house-trespass by night, 
on the other hand appear in a large number of reported judgements, all concerned with 
more serious offences such as rape or murder committed in the course trespassing on 
the victim’s property.5 
 
In addition to criminal offences to prevent the illegal occupation of land, a dedicated 
provision for the recovery of land in civil proceedings was included as section 9 of the 
Specific Relief Act, 1877, a colonial, British-Indian statute which continues to apply in 
Pakistan: “If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property 
otherwise than in due course of the law, he or any other person claiming through him, 
may by suit recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set 
up in such suit.” Again, there are only few reported decisions under this section, with 
many cases concerned with the dismissal of civil petitions under section 9 because the 
land in question was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts established 
under provincial tenancy acts such as the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Tenancy Act, 1950.6  
Case law also reveals the long delays inherent in civil proceedings and as such 
preventing this provision from giving meaningful relief. Mst Qasima Begum vs. 
Abdullah through Legal Heirs and others [2013 CLC 191] can be referred to by way of 
illustration. In 1963 one Mr Haji Akhtar had purchased a plot of land from the Allama 
Usmani Cooperative Housing Society Limited in Nazimabad, Karachi. Subsequently, 
one Mr Abdullah “ […] forcibly occupied the said plot and raised unauthorized 
construction thereon and on being approached to vacate the same, he refused to do so 
and hence the suit in question had to be filed by the said Haji Akhtar Hussain in the 
year 1967 on the basis of the refusal of the defendant to vacate and hand over the vacant 
possession of the suit plot to the plaintiff on 11-8-1965.” By 1990 both Mr Abdullah, 
the defendant, and Mr Haji Akhtar, the plaintiff, had passed away and their legal heirs 
were joined to the civil suit. 45 years later, after several rounds of litigation before the 
lower courts, the dispute was finally decided by the Sindh High Court in 2010, holding 
that whilst the plaintiffs in principle would have had a remedy to regain the property 
under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, they had failed to prove neither title 
nor possession of the disputed property and had failed to implead the Cooperative 
Housing Society as a third party, the latter now being time-barred. In addition, their 
ancestor Mr Haji Akhtar’s claim of ownership of the plot had not been made on oath 
and was therefore inadmissible.7  
                                                 
5 According to the Pakistanlawsite database, there were over 150 reported cases 
involving section 443 and 444 PPC between 1951 and 2018: 
www.pakistanlawsite.com, last visited 1 May 2018. 
6 See for instance Muhammad Saeed vs. Abdur Rahim [PLD 2015 Peshawar 94]. 
7 Civil cases affected by long delays are reported gleefully by newspapers whenever 
the topic of the large number of pending cases in Pakistan’s courts comes up, which it 
does frequently. For instance, in January 2018 The News reported that the Supreme 
Court had announced a verdict in a 100-year-old property inheritance that had started 
in the court of Rajasthan, India, in 1918 [The News, 31 January 2018]. 
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As part of the colonial legacy of laws, Pakistan also inherited section 145 of the British 
Indian, and now Pakistan, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which empowers a 
magistrate as part of his preventive jurisdiction to intervene in property disputes which 
are likely to cause the “breach of the peace.” The lack of reported decisions suggests 
that this provision is rarely, if ever, used. 
Section 19 and of the Presidency Small Courts Act 1882, introduced to reduce the case-
load of the high courts and to provide a simplified procedure for civil suits valued below 
Rs 2000, excluded from their jurisdiction suits for the recovery of immovable property 
as well as suits for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable 
property but made an exception was made with regard to suits involving tenancies. 
Chapter VII the Presidency Small Courts Act 1882 contained a dedicated provision 
allowing a landlord to apply for the removal of tenant whose tenancy had been 
“determined or withdrawn.” On the tenant’s refusal to vacate the property, the landlord 
could apply for a summons calling upon him to show cause why he should not be 
compelled to deliver up the property. If the tenant failed to show that he was in lawful 
occupation, the bailiff could be ordered to remove him from the property. Anticipating 
the possibility that the newly introduced law could be abused, an applicant for a 
summons who in fact had not been entitled to do so was not only deemed to be a 
trespasser against the occupant but the wronged tenant could also apply for 
compensation and costs in the same set of proceedings. 
 
In independent Pakistan, several additional laws were passed to recover public land 
illegally encroached or appropriated. The Central Government Lands and Buildings 
(Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965 and the West Pakistan Autonomous Bodies 
Immovable Property (Ejectment of Unauthorized Occupants) Ordinance, 1965 allow 
for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of any land or building owned by 
respectively the central government or autonomous bodies, such as a university, as the 
well as the demolition and removal of illegal buildings and structures. Several laws, 
such as the Punjab Autonomous Bodies Immovable Property (Ejectment of 
Unauthorised Occupants) Ordinance, 1965, provide the same remedies to provincial 
governments. The law reports record only few cases under any of these statutes and 
ordinances, indicating that the state is slow to use these remedies in order to remove 
encroachments from public land. One of the handful of reported judgements is the case 
Hasam Ud Din vs. Quetta Metropolitan Corporation [2016 SCMR 1433] which was 
concerned with the Quetta Municipal Corporation’s decision to increase the rent 
payable by tenants of shops owned by the Corporation. The tenants’ attempt to resist 
paying the increase, which had lasted for the past 16 years, was unsuccessful with the 
Supreme Court holding that failure to make payment of the accumulated arrears would 
entitle the Corporation to seek their removal under the provisions of the Baluchistan 
Autonomous Bodies Immovable Property (Ejectment of Unauthorised Occupants) 
Ordinance, 1965. 
 
In 2002, during the military regime of General Musharraf, Chief Executive and 
President of Pakistan between 1999 and 2, the government promulgated the Small 
Claims and Minor Offences Courts Ordinance, 2002 in an attempt to provide an 
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inexpensive and expeditious disposal of small claims and offences. The jurisdiction of 
the Small Claims and Minor Offences courts extends to several suits concerned with 
rights over immovable property, listed in Part I of Schedule I of the Ordinance, 
including suits for separate possession of joint immovable property through partition or 
otherwise, for redemption of mortgage property, for enforcement of easement rights, 
for rendition of accounts of joint property and suits to restrain waste and remove 
nusiances. Finally, in section 13, the Ordinance included “Suit for compensation for 
wrongful taking or damaging movable or immovable property”. Limited in their jurisdiction to 
civil disputes valued at no more than Rs 100,000.-, the Ordinance would not apply to the 
majority of suits concerning rights in immovable property.   
 
In 1993, the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan examined the problem of land-
grabbing in a report entitled “Eradication of ‘Qabza’ Group Activities”. The Report 
identifies the modus operandi of land-grabbing, namely criminal groups with 
established links to the police and revenue officials, describing them as ranging from 
“taking unauthorised/illegal possession of someone’s property to blackmailing and 
intimidating the owners of property, preparing forged documents and filing fictitious 
suits for laying claim to such property.” The services of these so-called Qabza groups 
were available for hire and “in certain localities these groups operate not underground 
or under any cover but openly and visibly” because they “have the blessings of high 
and mighty and are often backed by powerful social, political and bureaucratic elite”. 
This backing makes it “impossible for the law enforcing agencies to nab them.” The 
legal system fails to protect the victims of Qabza groups because “litigation is costly, 
tedious and slow.” As a result, victims of Qabza groups “almost invariably prefer an 
out-of-the-court compromise, meekly surrendering to the demands of these groups.” 
With the victims left without any remedy, there was a threat of “lawlessness, nay 
anarchy” which undermined the rule of law, eroded the right of an individual to the 
protection of the law and violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to property. The 
Law and Justice Commission appended to its report a draft law entitled the “Eradication 
of ‘Qabza’ Group Activities Act, 1993”. Its principal features were the creation of a 
criminal offence “illegal dispossession” by a qabza group, group, defined as “a person 
or group of persons committing an act of illegal possession of or illegal dispossession 
from property by means of fraud, intimidation, duress, assault or in any other manner 
otherwise than in due course of law.”  The trial court was to decide any case under the 
act within thirty days and no adjournment was to be granted for more than two working 
days. The trial court was also to be empowered to grant interim relief by putting the 
owner into possession of his property or to attach the property until “final determination 
of the rights of the parties.” 
 
 
It took another twelve years for the proposals of the Law and Justice Commission to be 
implemented. The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 shares with its still born 1993 
predecessor several features: it creates an offence of ‘land-grabbing’, authorises the trial 
court to order police investigations and to restore the property to the lawful owners both 
as interim-relief during the pendency of the trial and at its conclusion. In order to ensure 
a speedy trial, any proceedings must be concluded within 60 days and no adjournment 
can be granted for more than seven days. Unlike the 1993 draft law, the 2005 Act omits 
the term ‘Qabza” altogether.  
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The constituent parts of the 2005 Act appear deceptively simple, following the 
conventional structure of a Pakistani statute, with a preamble, definitions of terms, the 
definition of the offence itself, its classification as “non-cognisable offence” and the 
court’s power of arrest of the accused, a section dedicated to investigation and 
procedure followed by three sections dedicated to interim powers of the trial court to 
make orders with regard to the disputed property during the pendency of the 
proceedings. As it turned out, for a social evil as complex and pervasive as land 
grabbing, the 2005 Act proved too simple. 
 
The Preamble of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 Act sets out its objective as “An 
Act to curb the activities of the property grabbers. Whereas it is expedient to protect 
the lawful owners and occupiers of immovable properties from their illegal or forcible 
dispossession therefrom by the property grabbers.”  With the overall objective defined 
as curbing the activities of “property grabbers”, in the 2005 Act itself, the definition of 
the new criminal offence of “illegal dispossession of property” lacks any reference to 
“property grabbers”, with sub-section 3 (1) defining the offence as follows: “No one 
shall enter into or upon any property to dispossess, grab, control or occupy it without 
having any unlawful authority to do so with the intention to dispossess, grab, control 
or occupy the property from owner or occupier of such property.” Punishable by a 
maximum of ten years of imprisonment and with a fine, sub-section 3(2) also adds that 
the offender can be sentenced to compensate the victim. A further definition of the 
crime of illegal dispossession was introduced by the Illegal Dispossession 
(Amendment) Act, 2016 which added a new sub-section (3) providing that “Whoever 
forcibly and wrongfully dispossesses any owner or occupier of any property and his act 
does not fall within sub-section (1), shall be punished with imprisonment which may 
extend to three years or with fine or with both and also be liable to compensate the 
victim […]”. The addition of the offence of forcibly and wrongfully dispossessing the 
owner or occupier is wider than the original offence because the prosecution does not 
need to prove that this act had been carried out with the intention “to dispossess, grab, 
control or occupy the property.” Section 4 makes the offence non-cognizable, meaning 
that it can be tried by the Court of Session, the most senior criminal trial court, only on 
a complaint filed by the complainant directly in the court. In contrast, a complaint 
involving a cognizable offence can only be filed in a police station in the form of a First 
Information Report. Section 5 provides for a speedy trial, namely that “the Court shall 
proceed with the trial from day to day and shall decide the case within sixty days” and 
requires the court, upon receiving a complaint, to direct the officer-in-charge of a police 
station to investigate and to forward the completed investigation to the court within 
fifteen days. 
 
Section 6 gives the court the power to attach the property if it is “satisfied that none of 
the persons are in possession immediately before the commission of the offence.” 
Section 7 provides for the granting of interim relief “If during the trial the Court is 
satisfied that a person is found prima facie to be not in lawful possession, the Court 
shall, as interim relief direct him to put the owner of the occupier as the case may be, 
in possession.”  On the conclusion of the trial, “if the Court finds that an owner or 
occupier was illegally dispossessed or property was grabbed in contravention of 
section 3 the court may restore the property to the owner or occupier.” 
 
In an attempt to curb the trend of bringing unfounded complaints of illegal 
dispossession a new sub-section 3 (4) provides that if on conclusion of the trial the 
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complaint is found to be false, frivolous or vexatious, the court may award 
compensatory cost to the wrongfully accused which may extend to five hundred 
thousand Rupees, about $5,000 at March 2018 exchange rates. 
 
Finally, the Illegal Dispossession (Amendment) Act, 2016 added a new section 8A 
which provides that any conviction is appealable to the High Court. 
 
As will be seen in the following sections, the 2005 Act had a rocky reception by 
Pakistan’s higher judiciary. High courts and the Supreme Court produced a string of at 
times contradictory judgements. Veering from wide to narrow definitions of the crime 
of illegal dispossession, requiring but also refusing to prove that the crime had been 
committed by “land-grabbers”, reading into the 2005 Act a right to appeal, and 
pondering on the question whether any pending civil litigation over the property in 
question would make any criminal proceedings of illegal dispossession impossible, 
these judgements showed Pakistan’s high judiciary divided and uncertain. Common to 
all of the reported decisions is one factor, namely the popularity of the use of the 2005 
Act. As of 2018, just short of 350 judgements have been reported, all of them as appeals 
against decisions by sessions courts, i.e. the criminal trial courts. Whilst crime statistics 
do not contain any disaggregated information on the offence of illegal dispossession, 
the high number of appeals strongly suggests that 2005 Act has not been a quickly 
forgotten addition to the statutes book but has been put to active use. 
 
III. The Illegal Possession Act 2005 in Practice 
 
a. A Law against the Land Mafia? 
 
The Lahore High Court was the first of the five high courts that decided an appeal 
against a conviction under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. In Zahoor Ahmad v. The 
State [PLD 2007 Lah 23] Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa was deeply unimpressed with 
the very fact the 2005 Act had been passed, anticipating many of the problems and 
difficulties that have affected the application of the 2005 Act. Firstly, Justice Khosa 
pointed out that there were already a number of laws dealing with the issue of illegal 
dispossession and “Illegal dispossession from property is not uncommon or unusual 
but what is more rare and infrequent is a mistaken or misguided dispossession of some 
existing laws by a new law from a field that stands legitimately occupied by the existing 
laws.” [at para. 2] Secondly, Justice Khosa examined the history of the 2005 Act, 
highlighting that it was not the finest example of legislative draftmanship [at p. 247] 
and holding that it “is restricted in its scope and applicability to only those cases where 
a dispossession from immovable property has allegedly come about through the hands 
of a class or a group of persons who have the credentials or antecedents of being 
property grabbers/Qabza Group/ land mafia and the said Act does not apply to the run 
of the mill cases of alleged dispossessions from immovable properties by ordinary 
persons […].” [at para. 5]  
 
After reviewing the debates in both the National Assembly and the Senate, Justice 
Khosa found that the expression “property grabbers” used in the Illegal Dispossession 
Act, 2005 “stands for Qabza Groups and land mafia and for individuals who without 
any lawful or justifiable claim to an immovable property grab the same by force or 
deceitful means through an organized and calculated methodology or stratagem.” [at 
para. 5]  
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In that case, Justice Khosa found that the complainant had used the Illegal 
Dispossession Act, 2005 against the petitioner only to “circumvent the normal civil 
proceedings pending in the matter and to bring the weight of the criminal law to bear 
upon the petitioners so as to short-circuit the issue.”  [at para. 5]  
 
Without holding any part of the 2005 Act expressly unconstitutional, the Lahore High 
Court nevertheless remarked that the absence of a right to appeal was un-Islamic and 
liable to be struck down on this ground. In a final show of disapproval, Justice Khosa 
referred to the Indian Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, advising 
the Federal Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights to use it as a model for 
amending the 2005 Act.  The reference to an Indian law was picked up by the Indian 
Press, with the Hindustan Times reporting on the judgment under the headline “Pak 
court tells Govt to study Indian law”.8 
 
Such was the concern of the 2005 Act being misused in order to short-cut civil litigation, 
that the Lahore High Court framed a Guidance Note which restricted the use of the 
2005 Act to instances of illegal dispossession by the “land mafia”. The Guidance Note 
provides that a Court of Session can only take cognizance of a case under the 2005 Act 
“if some material exists showing involvement of the persons complained against in 
some previous activity connected with illegal dispossession from immovable property 
or the complaint demonstrates an organized and calculated effort by some persons 
operating individually or in groups to grab by force or deceit property to which they 
have no lawful, ostensible or justifiable claim.” The Guidance Note also clarifies that 
the 2005 Act: 
 
…does not apply to run of the mill cases of alleged dispossession from 
immovable properties by ordinary persons having no credentials or antecedents 
of being property grabbers/Qabza Group/land mafia, i.e. cases of disputes over 
immovable properties between co-owners or co-sharers, between landlords and 
tenants, between persons claiming possession on the basis of inheritance, 
between persons vying for possession on the basis of competing title documents, 
contractual agreements or revenue record or cases with a background of an on-
going private dispute over the relevant property. 
 
 
The Peshawar High Court followed the ruling of the Lahore and applied a narrow 
interpretation to the ambit and effect of the 2005 Act by limiting its application to cases 
connected to illegal dispossession by the land mafia. In Jan Pervez v. Fazal Hussain 
[PLD 2007 Pesh 179] a party to an on-going civil litigation concerning the ownership 
of a plot of land managed to get the matter dealt with under the penal provisions of the 
2005 Act. The other party filed an application in the Peshawar High Court for the 
quashing of these criminal proceedings. The Peshawar High Court held that civil cases 
which were pending at the time of the enactment of the 2005 Act could not be made 
subject of the provisions of the new legislation. Doing so would amount to the 
                                                 
8 Hindustan Times, 20/01/2017, at 
www.hindustantimes.com/storyPage/Print/200920.aspx, accessed 9 July 2014. 
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imposition of retrospective punishment in breach of Article 12 of the Constitution 
19739. Justice Dost Muhammad Khan held: 
 
section 3 [of the 2005 Act] has provided expressions “to grab, to control or to 
occupy” which is a clear manifestation of the intent of the Law makers in 
curbing the illegal activities of the land grabbing mafia which had assumed a 
monstrous character in the last more than two decades thus, the new law shall 
not be pressed into service by the Courts in ordinary cases of dispossession or 
recovery of possession which squarely fall within the ambit of civil disputes and 
can be effectively regulated and the grievance can be redressed under section 
9 or 8 of the Specific Relief Act. [at para. 11] 
 
 
A number of high court followed the narrow interpretation adopted by the Lahore High 
Court. In Yafas v. The State [PLD 2007 Peshawar 123] the Peshawar High Court held 
that the 2005 Act had laid down an expeditious and strict procedure:  
 
…with a purpose to discourage attempts of illegal dispossession and to restore 
the propriety confidence, and possession, to owners within the minimum 
possible time and to discourage the land grabbers by deterrent punishment. 
However, such a special statute with special mechanism can neither be applied 
to all the cases of trespass and dispossession not the power of the civil court 
and the revenue court has been withdrawn through the said legislation. [at para. 
10]  
 
In Syed Naseem Ahmed v. Mst. Huma Noor [2009 PCrLJ 134] the Karachi High Court 
held that on the facts of the case no nexus to property-grabbers had been established 
and that therefore the 2005 Act did not apply. Justice Syed Rizvi, however, went further 
than just dismissing the case, by finding that there had been an encroachment and that 
the encroacher should “pay at least double amount of the land encroached by him to 
the respondent against the market prize […] otherwise the concerned department shall 
demolish the construction raised by the applicant on the respondent’s plot.” [at para. 
11] 
 
 
b. A Law against Illegal Dispossession? 
 
At the level of the Supreme Court the restrictive approach adopted by the high courts 
of Lahore and Peshawar found no support. In Rahim Tahir v. Ahmed Jan [PLD 2007 
SC 423], the Supreme Court applied the provisions of the 2005 Act without any 
negative remarks or censure to a case not concerned with the grabbing of any land by a 
criminal gang but with a civil dispute over the effectiveness of a lease agreement. The 
Supreme Court found that the lease agreement was legally flawed and not effective and 
therefore the occupation of the land by the accused was illegal. It did not matter that 
the illegal occupation had commenced two years before the Illegal Dispossession Act 
2005 had come into force since “The purpose of this special law was to protect the 
                                                 
9 Article 12 (1) of Constitution of Pakistan 1973 provides that “No law shall authorize 
the punishment of a person for (a) an act or omission that was not punishable by law 
at the time of the act or omission. […]” 
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right of possession of lawful owners and not to perpetuate the possession of illegal 
occupants.” [at para. 8] No link to the land mafia had to be established for the Illegal 
Dispossession Act 2005 to apply. 
 
Similarly, in 2009, in Muhammad Akram v. Muhammad Yousaf [2009 SCMR 1066] the 
Supreme Court decided an appeal against a judgement of the High Court of Lahore 
which in a dispute over the illegal occupation of a residential plot of land had found in 
favour of a complainant-owner. The Supreme Court confirmed that the 2005 Act was 
applicable to all cases of illegal occupation of land and not just to incidents of land-
grabbing by criminal gangs. 
 
The expansive interpretation at the level of the Supreme Court was only briefly 
interrupted when a three-member bench expressly overruled the dictum in Rahim Tahir 
that the 2005 Act could have retrospective application. In Dr Muhammad Sardar v. 
Edward Henry Louis [PLD 2009 SC 404] the Supreme Court decided that “[Rahim 
Tahir] did not lay down the correct law to the extent of retrospective application of the 
Act, 2005. […] There is nothing to indicate that the Act of 2005 was intended to have 
any retrospective operation.”  
 
Ten months later, in Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr Nasir Khan [2010 SCMR 1254] the 
Supreme Court changed its mind and returned to the precedent set in Rahim Tahir, 
holding that the 2005 Act applied also to cases of illegal dispossession which occurred 
before the 2005 Act had come into force. The Supreme Court reasoned that the offence 
of illegal dispossession had already existed in the form of criminal trespass and 
therefore “appears to be an aggravated from of the offence under section 441, PPC.” 
[at para. 16] The only exception to the retrospective application of the 2005 Act 
concerned cases where civil litigation over the property was already pending before a 
court.  
 
In Shahabuddin vs. The State [PLD 2010 SC 725] the Supreme Court again refused to 
restrict the offence of illegal possession to those identified as members of the land 
mafia, holding that:  
 
So far as the contention of the learned counsel that the Act, 2005 is meant for 
the land grabbers, whereas the petitioner is not a land grabber, is concerned, 
this argument is also not available to him for the reason that he had failed to 
prove his lawful ownership over the property in dispute. More so, the Act, 2005 
is a special enactment, promulgated to discourage the land grabbers and to 
protect the rights of owner and lawful occupants of the property as against the 
unauthorized and illegal occupants. [at para. 8]  
 
In Mumtaz Hussain v. Dr Nasir Khan [2010 SCMR 1254] the Supreme Court addressed 
one of the remaining hindrances to the ready use of the 2005 Act, namely the 
determination of the title to the property between the accused and the complainant. A 
court could not find an accused guilty of property grabbing without determining with a 
degree of certainty whether or not he had not acquired a right, or indeed title, over the 
property in question. For a criminal court, such a determination would be difficult, 
especially given the tight time-limit of 60 days within which the trial had to be 
completed and the fact that the only inquiry into the facts of the case was to be carried 
by the police. The Supreme Court dismissed these concerns and held that the trial court 
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was only required “to simply form an opinion as to whether prima facie any party is 
coming within the ambit of definition mentioned in section 3 of the Act” and “In the 
present type of proceedings, the question required to be resolved is the possession and 
dispossession etc. within the meaning of section 3 of the Act, as the parties have not, 
nor can come for adjudication of their title in the property.” [at paras. 12 and13] 
 
 
In five judgements, starting with Rahim Tahir in 2007, the Supreme Court had 
effectively, albeit never expressly, overruled the judgement of the Lahore High Court 
in Zahoor Ahmad as well as the other high court decisions that had followed its 
reasoning. As a result, from 2008 the law reports begin to fill up with reported decisions 
from the five provincial high courts based on an expansive interpretation of the 2005 
Act. In Alia Hussain v. Syed Ziauddin [PLD 2008 Quetta 27], a widow with three 
children had left her house in Quetta in order to live in Karachi. In her absence, it was 
alleged, the accused had forcibly occupied the house. The accused produced documents 
to bolster his claim that he had purchased the property but these were judged to be 
forgeries. The widow was given interim possession and the Quetta High Court ordered 
that both criminal and civil proceedings should continue in parallel. There was no 
evidence to suggest that the accused had been a property-grabber.  
 
In Abdul Rehman v. Muhammad Shaid Qureshi [PLD 2009 Karachi 117] the Karachi 
High Court found that despite no case of land-grabbing by land-grabbers having been 
made out but that the case should nevertheless proceed under the 2005 Act:  
 
…in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahim 
Tahir (supra) in which it has been held that the provision of the Illegal 
Dispossession Act are applicable in all cases of dispossession except the case 
which was pending before any other form at the time of the promulgation of the 
Act of 2005. [at para. 7] 
 
In Anjuman Jilani v. Mst Feroza Jilani [2008 YLR 2095] the Peshawar High Court was 
faced with an intra-family dispute over the inheritance of a house in the course of which 
the son had removed his widowed mother from the disputed property and also her 
residence. The mother filed a criminal complaint under the 2005 Act against her son. 
The trial court found the son guilty and sentenced him to one year of rigorous 
imprisonment. His appeal against the conviction was refused by the Peshawar High 
Court on the ground that: 
 
The contention of the appellant, that the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession 
Act, 2005 were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, is 
without any substance as the provisions of the Act were not only applicable to 
the land grabbers and land mafia but were also applicable to the forcible 
dispossession of a person from his lawful possession as held in the cases of 
Rahim Tahir PLD 2007 SC 423. […]. [at para. 8]  
 
In Shahabuddin v. The State [2010 PCr.LJ 422] the Karachi High Court brushed aside 
even the fact that civil litigation had been pending when the complaint under the 2005 
Act was lodged, holding that: 
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I do not think that this is a material point. Anybody who files a civil suit whether 
before an act of illegal dispossession or after an of illegal dispossession, cannot 
wipe away his offence of illegal dispossession. If it is held that if a suit is filed 
before dispossession complaint would not be maintainable all that a careful 
offender will have to is to file suit and therefore indulge in the act of 
dispossession and thus do not with impunity. The law cannot be allowed to be 
defeated by such subterfuges. Therefore, in a case of illegal dispossession 
pendency of suit will have no bearing whatsoever. [at para. 32]  
 
The conviction was up-held but the sentence reduced from ten to three years’ 
imprisonment on the ground that “It was a naked plot of land. It was not a case of 
dispossession of someone from his home and hearth. It was not a case of person who 
was alleged to be a professional land grabber and in any case there is no evidence of 
any such previous criminal activity of the accused.” [at para. 34] 
 
 
c. A Law against the Land Mafia! 
 
In the course of 2011, the Supreme Court changed direction. None of the reported 
judgements of the high courts and the Supreme Court had contained a single instance 
of property having been grabbed by a Qabza Group or the land mafia. Instead, the 
majority of cases were concerned with incidents of encroachments, disputes over titles 
or demarcations of land or fights over inheritances between members of the same 
family. With the floodgates fully opened, the Supreme Court now attempted to stem 
the tide of litigation. Ignoring the precedent set by five judgements, in Muhammad Afzal 
v. Saeedullah Khan [2011 SCMR 1137] the Supreme Court declared that the 2005 Act 
did, after all, not have retrospective effect and as a result did not apply to cases of 
dispossession that had occurred before the 2005 Act had come into force.  Justice Asif 
Khosa of the Supreme Court, who in 2007 had been the author of the Zahoor Ahmad 
decision of the Lahore High Court [PLD 2007 Lah 231], held that in the light of the 
2009 judgement of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Safar that “the penal provisions 
contained in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could not be given retrospective 
effect.” [at para. 2] No mention was made of the Mumtaz Hussain decision of 2011 
which had decided the opposite. 
 
Towards the end of 2011, the Supreme Court completed the second step of its retreat. 
In Waqar Ali v. The State [PLD 2011 SC 181] the purchaser of a parcel of open land 
found that following the production of demarcation report by the revenue department, 
his neighbour was in the “illegal possession” of parts of his land. Rather than 
commencing civil proceedings, the purchaser filed a complaint under section 3 of the 
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The trial court found that the complaint was prima 
facie maintainable and took cognizance of the case. The accused appealed first to the 
High Court of Peshawar and then to the Supreme Court to have the case against him 
quashed.  In the High Court his writ petition was refused on the ground that the trial 
court’s order was not a final one and therefore could not be challenged under its 
constitutional jurisdiction. The accused turned to the Supreme Court for help. 
Reviewing the facts of the case, Justice Jawwad Khawaja found that on the basis of the 
complaint filed by the purchaser it was apparent this “is a dispute of a purely civil 
nature between the parties as to the exact location of their respective pieces parcels of 
land.” [at para. 8] Before the trial court could take cognizance of a case under the 2005 
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Act, the judge had to satisfy himself that the “complaint disclose the existence of both, 
an unlawful act (actus reas] and criminal intent (mens rea].” [at para. 8] Evidence of 
guilty intention was required before proceedings under the 2005 Act could be 
commenced. Justice Khawaja observed:  
 
In a very important sense a Court empowered to take cognizance of an offence 
under the Act, is required to act as a sieve and to filter out those complaints 
which do not disclose the requisite criminal intent. Courts which have been 
authorised to try cases under the Act thus have a responsibility to see that the 
persons named in the complaint have a case to answer, before they are 
summoned to face trial. This course, unfortunately, has not been followed in the 
present case. As a result the appellants unnecessarily, have had to face trouble, 
expense and disruption in their lives. In this process the time and scarce 
resources of the Court have also been wasted and its docket burdened without 
cause. […] The provisions of this Act, in our opinion, have to be interpreted in 
line with established jurisprudence on criminal law. This will ensure that the 
process of law is not abused through the filing of vexatious complaints. Courts 
are also duty bound to scrutinize complaints and, if necessary, examine 
complaints, to protect hapless victims of false complaints or complaints which 
do not show the existence of all necessary elements of an alleged offence. [at 
paras. 13, 14]  
 
In Habibullah v. Abdul Manan [2012 SCMR 153] the Supreme Court restricted the 
scope of the 2005 Act. Further. Chief Justice Ijaz Ahmed Choudhry found that the 
dispute which had given rise to criminal proceedings under the 2005 Act was between 
two individuals over immovable property: “[..] it is established that the said law is 
applicable only to these accused persons who have the credentials or antecedents of 
Qabza Group and are involved in illegal activities and belong to the gang of land 
grabbers or land mafia.” [at para. 8] Justice Chaudhry acquitted the three accused, 
finding that the trial court “had illegally connected the appellants with the offence 
falling under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act which has been made for special 
purposes and for special objects and had wrongly sentenced the appellants.” [at para. 
9] 
 
Such were the concerns about the potential of the 2005 Act being abused that in 2013, 
Pakistan’s Law and Justice Commission recommended the imposition of compensatory 
cost on the complainants who misuse the process of law by filing false and frivolous 
applications under the 2005 Act. [The Nation, 09/09/2013]  
 
At the level of the high courts, the filtering of cases to those concerned with the land 
mafia and prima facie criminal intent to commit the crime of illegal dispossession, as 
ordered by the Supreme Court, can be observed. In Muhammad Fareed v. The State 
[2013 YLR 133] the Karachi High Court was able to state that: 
 
It is settled law that a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 
cannot be entertained where the matter of possession of the relevant property 
is being regulated by a civil or revenue court. The Illegal Possession Act is 
restricted in its scope and applicability to only those cases where a 
dispossession from immovable property has allegedly come about, through the 
hands […] of property grabbers/Qabza Groups/land mafia. [at para. 15]  
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In Abdul Baqi v. Attaullah [2013 P Cr. L J 787] the Quetta High Court found that the 
dispute was purely civil in nature and therefore not governed by the 2005 Act. Similarly 
in Shahid Hakeem v. Altaf Hussain Agha [2013 P Cr L J 188] the same high court 
acquitted the accused on the ground that the dispute involved an encroachment and 
trespass but that there was no evidence of an “intention of grabbing the property.” [at 
para. 8] In Muhammad Hayat Khan v. The State [2014 YLR 390] the petitioner 
succeeded with his plea to have his conviction and sentence to three years’ 
imprisonment overturned. The Lahore High Court held that the  
 
“Complainant had not produced evidence, oral or documentary to establish 
that the petitioner had credential or antecedents of being a land grabber” and 
that the trial court had “illegally connected the petitioner with the offence of 
falling under sections 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 which has 
been made for special purposes and for special objects and has wrongly 
sentenced the petitioner.” [at para. 14] 
  
f. A Law against Illegal Dispossession!  
 
 
The Supreme Court’s retreat to a more restrictive and narrow interpretation of the 2005 
Act resulted in two diametrically opposed interpretations of the 2005 Act within the 
country’s apex court – with the Supreme Court holding in Bashir Ahmad vs Additional 
Sessions Judge [PLD 2010 SC 661] and Habibullah vs. Abdul Manan [2012 SCMR 
1533] that only those proven to be members of the land grabbing mafia could be 
prosecuted under the 2005 Act and holding the opposite in Muhammad Akram v. 
Muhammad Yousaf [2009 SCMR 1066], Mumtaz Hussain vs. Dr Nasi Khan [2010 
SCMR 1066] and Shahabuddin vs. The State [PLD 2010 SC 725].  
 
The uncertainty persisted until 2016, when a five-member bench of the Supreme Court 
headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali, in the un-
reported case of Gulshan Bibi and others vs. Muhammad Sadiq and others [Civil 
Petition No. 41 of 2008 and Civil Appeal No. 2054 of 20017 & 1208 of 2015, date of 
hearing: 15 June 2016] held that the definition of the offence of illegal dispossession in 
section 3 of the 2005 Act was not restricted to any particular category of persons and 
“thus without any distinction any person who illegally dispossesses, grabs, controls or 
occupies property of lawful owner or occupier shall be liable for prosecution under the 
provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005.” Judgements which had held 
otherwise were not good law. 
 
A few months later, in the case of Shaikh Muhmmad Naseem vs. Farida Gul [2016 
SCMR 1931], the Supreme Court also resolved the judicial controversy of whether any 
pending civil litigation would act as bar to the commencement of criminal proceedings 
under the 2005 Act, as had been held by the Lahore High Court in Zahoor Ahmed [PLD 
2007 Lahore 23] and the Supreme Court in Bashir Ahmed [PLD 2010 SC 661]. 
According to the Supreme Court any act which entails both civil and criminal liability 
could be tried under both kinds of proceedings because: 
 
No one can be allowed to take law in his own hands and unlawfully dispossess 
an owner or lawful occupier of an immovable property and then seek to thwart 
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the criminal proceedings initiated against him under the Illegal Dispossession 
Act, 2005 on the pretext that civil litigation on the issue is pending adjudication 
between the parties in a court of law. [at para. 5] 
 
 
Whilst the Supreme Court settled the question of law, the issue of abuse of the law had 
not disappeared. With the restrictions on the use of the 2005 Act, namely a requirement 
to prove a nexus to criminal gangs in the form of land grabbers or the land mafia and a 
bar on criminal proceedings for illegal dispossession in the face of pending civil 
proceedings concerning the same property, now removed, any civil dispute concerning 
landed property could potentially be turned into a criminal prosecution. After all, the 
existence of a civil dispute as of necessity has to establish some form of “illegality” on 
the part of one of the parties to the dispute which disentitles them from having rights 
over the property. As such there was the possibility that any civil dispute over rights to 
or in immovable property could be converted into a criminal complaint under the 2005 
Act, with drastic consequences for those at the receiving end of the criminal 
proceedings. 
 
Judicial discomfort with the consequences of the clear and unambiguous binding 
precedent set by the Supreme Court in Shaikh Muhmmad Naseem vs. Farida Gul [2016 
SCMR 1931], is evident in several recent reported judgements. In Khudai Dad vs. 
Rahimuddin [2017 MLD 1143] the High Court of Baluchistan had to decide whether a 
criminal prosecution for illegal dispossession could be launched in addition to a 
pending civil litigation between co-sharers of land, with the complainant alleging that 
the accused had “illegally and unlawfully constructed a wall measuring 280 feet in 
length and 5 feet in height” on the disputed property. Observing that the object and 
spirit of the 2005 Act was to curb the activities of land grabbers and after referring to 
the overruled Supreme Court decision in Bashir Ahmed [PLD 2010 SC 661], the 
Baluchistan High Court held: 
 
For what has been discussed above, we hold that a civil dispute cannot be 
allowed to be converted into a criminal case for implicating co-sharers of the 
land in question as this would be misuse of the provisions of the Act of 2005, 
because regarding the civil disputes or the dispute amongst the co-sharers, the 
civil Court is a competent forum to resolve the said issue, after recording of 
evidence. 
 
Ignoring the binding precedent of Shaikh Muhmmad Naseem vs. Farida Gul [2016 
SCMR 1931], the Baluchistan High Court’s decision must be viewed as an act of 
judicial defiance in order to prevent an abuse of the law, namely to convert civil 
proceedings between parties into a criminal case.  
 
In Usman Ali vs. Additional Sessions Judge, Toba Tek Singh and 9 others [2017 P Cr. 
LJ] the Lahore High Court was also faced with an attempt to add a criminal prosecution 
under the 2005 Act to an on-going civil litigation between co-sharers of agricultural 
land. Here also, the Lahore High Court ignored binding precedent and instead relied on 
the over-ruled Supreme Court judgement in Bashir Ahmed [PLD 2010 SC 661] in order 
to rule that “it is settled law that co-sharers do not fall into the category of land 
grabbers/Qabza groups” and that: 
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Therefore, the case being of civil nature, the provisions of Illegal Dispossession 
Act, 2005, are not attracted to the facts of the case because the same is restricted 
to class or group of persons, who have antecedents of being property 
grabbers/qabza groups and the said Act is not applicable to the cases involving 
disputes over possession of immoveable property. [at para. 7] 
 
In Allah Rakho vs. The State [2017 YLR Note 409], the Karachi High Court also 
ignored the precedent set by six decisions of the Supreme Court, stressing that in order 
for a criminal complaint to be accepted by the Court of Session, the complainant must 
show “an organized and calculated effort by some persons operating individually or in 
groups to grab by force or deceit property to which they have no lawful, ostensible or 
justifiable claim.” [at para 9] 
 
 
d. Blind Spots 
 
There is one group of occupants of land who, irrespective of expansive or restrictive 
interpretations of the 2005 Act, were excluded from its ambit ever since its enactment, 
namely the residents of slums and ‘katchi abadis’, i.e. informal settlements. The case 
of Muhammad Arshad v. Sultan Muree [2008 MLD 1654] can be referred to by way of 
example. The case concerned a Mr Arshad, a seller of auto parts, who had been forcibly 
evicted from his shop by what appeared to be property-grabbers. Mr Arshad adduced 
evidence in the form electricity bills, telephone bills, income tax and shop tax to the 
effect that he had been running the shop at that location for the past 15 years. However, 
his attempt to regain possession of his shop failed because “admittedly, the appellant 
is not the owner of the property in dispute as admitttedly the property in dispute is 
situated in an katchi abadi and he himself is the land grabber over a government land, 
as such his possession over government land in any way could not be termed to be 
lawful possession over the property in question.” [at para. 8]. The same conclusion was 
reached in Nazir Ahmad v. Asif and 4 others [PLD 2008 Karachi 94] where the victim 
of an illegal dispossession had been residing in his house for the past 40 years. The 
Karachi High Court held that “The Fatima Jinnah Colony is admittedly a Katchi Abadi 
and the applicant himself has occupied the land as a land-grabber. The land-grabbers 
have no right to approach the courts to protect their rights.” [at para. 7]  
 
 
Neither could the 2005 Act be pressed into service in order to remove illegal occupiers 
from public land. In Naseer Ahmed v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jhelum 
[2008 P Cr. L J 1124] the complainant had accused the respondent of “blocking a 
thoroughfare abutting the house of the complainant.” Given that there was no 
dispossession of the complainant himself, his complaint was rejected. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The passage and reception of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 offers a cautionary 
tale of the dangers of over-simplification, of the deceptive lure of quick legal fixes to 
complex social problems and the risk that more law does not always mean less crime.  
 
Introduced into a badly functioning criminal justice system the Illegal Dispossession 
Act 2005 seemed to offer a simple way to cut the proverbial knot of an ever increasing 
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number of reported instances of land-grabbing by creating an offence of illegal 
dispossession that would allow the victim to reclaim his property quickly whilst also 
punishing the criminals. The latter would in turn act as a deterrent, given that jail 
sentences could extend to 10 years, and ultimately result in a reduction of the crime of 
illegal dispossession itself.  
 
In the case of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 this simple rationale underlying the 
function of a criminal offence remained unfulfilled. Indeed, it is arguable that more law 
lead to more rather than less crime because the only vaguely defined offence of illegal 
dispossession fitted a wide range of civil disputes over competing or overlapping claims 
to rights in immovable property which until 2005 had not been treated as criminal 
offences. Seeing civil disputes turned into criminal offences did not appeal to a number 
of judges of Pakistan’s higher judiciary as can be discerned from the reported judgments 
which adopted a narrow definition of the offence of illegal dispossession, limiting it to 
cases where a link to land grabbers or the land mafia could be established. Other judges 
took the opposite view, arguing in their judgements that such a narrow interpretation 
would render the 2005 Act impotent because establishing a link to the land mafia would 
be difficult if not impossible. Whilst the terms land mafia and Qabza groups suggest an 
organised criminal underworld, the reality of land grabbing manifests itself in not such 
neat a formation. Land grabbing represents a phenomenon than an organisation with 
crime not necessarily its modus operandi. The land-grabber filing of a frivolous civil 
claim to blackmail the owner of a property to pay a ransom for the suit to be withdrawn 
takes advantage of the deficiencies in the administration of civil justice rather than 
committing a criminal offence. The buyer of a house built on land that had been grabbed 
form the public exchequer might have knowledge of that fact but nevertheless decided 
to take the risk of obtaining a title that might later be challenged. Is he as guilty of 
illegal dispossession as the person who had grabbed the land in the first place, often 
through bribing public servants?  
 
 
When faced with cases that did not fit the stated purpose of the Illegal Dispossession 
Act 2005, namely to curb the activities of property grabbers, other high court and 
Supreme Court judges refused to concede that the new offence of illegal dispossession 
was incapable of addressing the social evil of land grabbing. Any act of dispossession, 
even if it presented itself in the form of an on-going civil dispute, could be brought 
under the purview of the 2005 Act. Whilst this approach has ensured convictions, the 
case law itself casts doubts over the merit of these convictions. After all, a civil dispute, 
however misconceived, does normally not amount to a crime. Judges have ample means 
to deter parties from bringing frivolous suits, including the imposition of costs orders 
and simply throwing the case out. Now addressed by an express provision of the 2005 
Act, added in 2017, allowing a court to impose costs and to pay compensation to the 
party wrongfully accused of illegal dispossession, it seems nevertheless inadequate as 
a means of protection against an unfounded prosecution.  
 
In its wide interpretation, the 2005 Act risks becoming a source of injustice and of 
miscarriages of justice, putting people into jail who had not committed any crime. It 
also has the potential of being used by the very people against whom the law is meant 
to act, namely the property grabbers themselves. There is nothing apart from the 
possibility of having to pay costs and compensation that would prevent a property 
grabber from using the Illegal Dispossession 2005 to threaten an owner of property and 
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to force him to give in to his demands. This risk affects especially those who are poor 
and who might be less able to prove their title to or interest in land. For them, the threat 
of a criminal prosecution quickly becomes existential: with no access to expensive 
lawyers and no connections to powerful networks of patronage, they have no effective 
means to fight a criminal case, in particular if the crime itself is only vaguely defined. 
The use of criminal law to intimidate owners of property has been highlighted in the 
context of wrongful accusations of blasphemy against members of Pakistan’s non-
Muslim communities as means to settle property disputes in favour of the Muslim 
accuser. 
 
In creating a new criminal offence to curb illegal land grabbing, the Illegal 
Dispossession Act 2005 can also be viewed as another example of Pakistan’s 
fascination with criminal law, punishments and the rule by law rather than of law. The 
application of the Anti-Terrorism Act1997 for seemingly minor and at least prima facie 
not terrorism related offences can serve as an example. As reported by the Dawn 
Newspaper on 5 May 20181, an anti-terrorism court in the city of Multan sentenced a 
man to 18 years of imprisonment because he had thrown - in a fit of anger and 
frustration because his case concerning an alleged robbery had been pending for nine 
months - one of his sandals at the judge.  
 
The case-law also offers the sobering conclusion that in its stated aim to curb the 
activities of the property grabbers, the 2005 Act has performed poorly. In none of the 
reported cases has it been possible to establish a connection to the nebulous land mafia 
preying on public and private land. One reason for this failure is the fact that acts of 
illegal dispossession are built on the foundations of other crimes: bribing of public 
servants, intimidation and removal of occupants of land with weakly documented titles, 
the building of mosques as a first step in the establishment of an illegal housing projects 
and such like. Illegal dispossession by land grabbers represents a bundle of distinct 
offences and has to be treated as such, given that the composition of each bundle will 
vary depending on the actual act of dispossession. A stronger, better resourced and de-
politicised enforcement of anti-corruption laws, an improved system for the recording 
of land titles, a more efficient court system and more consistent enforcement of existing 
laws protecting the owner of property against trespass and encroachment would make 
the addition of new, vaguely defined crime of illegal dispossession redundant. 
 
Finally, and arguably most worryingly, the case law examined in this article also reveals 
disagreement if not conflict within the high courts and indeed even Pakistan’s apex 
court. Diametrically opposed decisions are allowed to co-exist, the rules of judicial 
precedence are ignored and benches of varying sizes zigzag across the legal landscape 
without much consistency and clarity.  All of this in an area of law that affects the most 
fundamental rights of people, namely taking away their liberty and reputation as well 
as their political rights. With Pakistan’s Supreme Court ever more urgently asserting its 
right and duty to protect the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of the 
citizen against violation by the state, it must be seen as problematic that in its own 
decisions concerning the application of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 it might be 
doing just that. 
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